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Time's Arrow, Time's Cycle: Metaphors for a Period of Transition
DAVID JABLONSKY

From Parameters, Winter 1997-98, pp. 4-27.
"The world is so full of a number of things, I'm sure we should all be as happy as kings." --Robert Louis
Stevenson

In A Child's Garden of Verses, Robert Louis Stevenson describes this couplet as a "Happy Thought." And yet diversity
in the fields of natural and social sciences is normally not a source of joy. On the contrary, scientists in both fields are
usually not satisfied until they have established some kind of classification, some order out of complexity and
confusion. It is an innate desire for systemic closure that can overcome even the strongest natural caution. Thus in
1758, Linnaeus attempted to classify all of life in his Systema Naturae (the "System of Nature").[1] And more recently,
one historian concluded that "on March 5, 1953, at approximately 9:30 in the morning, the Cold War ended when
Joseph Stalin breathed his last."[2]
The search for order and control in the post-Cold War transition period is no less daunting. As in all such periods, there
is a natural tendency to attempt to fix a relationship between change and continuity. It is never, however, an easy
matter to classify and draw reliable distinctions between the two in advance of retrospect, to ascertain what is really
new and unique. How, for instance, could Herbert Hoover have known in the spring of 1930 that the accustomed past
would not reassert itself? Certainly there was no guide in the experiences of the 1893-97 depression or the financial
panics of 1907 and 1921. History, in short, often advances in disguise, making its appearance on stage in the mask of
the preceding scene. And when the curtain goes up in such cases, there is a tendency to superimpose the past on the
present, even when the present is a revolution. Nevertheless, continuity remains an important window into the past that
can inform the present and the future. This is why Thucydides can seem so contemporary--why, for instance, the
contest between Athens and Sparta in The Peloponnesian War seemed to resonate again in the Cold War, or why the
expedition to Syracuse had overtones for America's "half-war" in Vietnam.[3]
In all this, classifications of change and continuity are inextricably linked to perceptions of time. Time, in turn, is an
abstract concept that can best help the analyst by becoming less so. That type of transformation is often accomplished
by the use of metaphors, comparisons that help give shape and form to abstractions through images that are not
dependent on the weaker "like" or "as" foundations of the simile. Such are the metaphors of time as an arrow and time
as a cycle. These metaphors are not new and have been widely analyzed.[4] This article examines their application at
three levels of analysis concerned with international relations: the individual, the state, and the international system.[5]
The purpose is to demonstrate that the metaphors have great conceptual value at each level of analysis for those
attempting to understand and to order the interplay of change and continuity in the post-Cold War transition period.
The Metaphors
Time's arrow can be traced to the ancient Hebrew belief that historical processes operate in a linear framework, that
events such as the Exodus were unique occurrences at particular points in time. For the first time, religious leaders put
a value on history that transcended the traditional vision of the cycle (all things will be repeated forever) as they
discovered history's meaning as the epiphany of God. It is a picture of history as an irreversible sequence of
unrepeatable events. Each moment occupies its own distinct position in a temporal series that tells a story of linked
events moving in one direction. Like an actual projectile, time's arrow cannot reverse itself in flight. And as Heraclitus
discovered, it is impossible in this picture to step twice into the same river as time moves inexorably forward.[6]
Not surprisingly, time's arrow is the principal metaphor of biblical history, from God's creation of the world to the

dispatch of His Son to a particular place to die for man and rise again. Also implicit in this picture is the idea of
progress in direction, an idea impossible of conception if patterns merely repeat themselves. It is an arrow of history in
proper eschatological order from bad pasts to bright futures, from the Old Testament to resurrection and future bliss.
As Christianity evolved, this straight line continued to trace the course of humanity from initial Fall to Final
Redemption. The meaning of this history continued to be unique because the Incarnation was unique. "When the
Messiah comes, the world will be saved once and for all and history will cease to exist." Five centuries later in the City
of God, as he railed against cyclical time as a concept promulgated by "decaying and deceived sages," Augustine
continued to emphasize that "once Christ died for our sins; and, rising from the dead, He dieth no more."[7]
Time's cycle in its pure metaphorical form is an opposite pole of time's arrow. Events in this picture have no meaning
as distinct episodes with causal effects upon contingent history. Fundamental states remain immanent in time, forever
present, never changing. And what appear to be motions are actually part of repeating cycles. Time, in short, has no
direction. The differences of the past are destined to be realities of the future.
In actuality, of course, neither metaphor adequately describes the human condition. Despite the ubiquitous picture of
the biblical arrow, for instance, the metaphor of cyclical time is invoked in the book of Ecclesiastes: "The thing that
hath been, it is that which shall be; and that which is done is that which shall be done; and there is no new thing under
the sun." And even the arrow of Messianism holds a cyclic reminder that "death is always followed by resurrection;
that every defeat is annulled and transcended by the final victory."[8] In this context, history consists of cycles
advancing as they turn like a large disk moving along on a railroad track--an arrow moving forward within a cycle of
repetition. The cycle seeks the continuity of immanence, a set of principles so general that they exist outside of time
and record a universal character, a common bond among the rich particulars of history. But each repetition must be
different in order to impart a direction, a narrative power to history and thus make time intelligible. Arrows and cycles,
as Stephen Jay Gould has pointed out, "need each other if we ever hope to grasp the meaning of history." Each of the
poles, he concludes,
captures by its essence a theme so central to intellectual (and practical) life that Western people who hope
to understand history must wrestle intimately with both--for time's arrow is the intelligibility of distinct
and irreversible events, while time's cycle is the intelligibility of timeless order and lawlike structure. We
must have both.[9]
Evolution and Contingency: The Permanence of Time's Arrow
In the 18th century, the enlightened version of temporal development was still fundamentally teleological in nature.
The philosophers of that century, in Carl Becker's memorable phase, "demolished the Heavenly City of St. Augustine
only to rebuild it with more up-to-date materials."[10] It was, in other words, an old picture of time's arrow in a new
frame, in which the philosophers ascribed to nature all that the medievals had attributed to divine Providence, and
reinterpreted the moral demands of God's will as deliverances of reason. By 1800, however, a battle was joined over
the history of the earth between scriptural chronology based on human traditions and natural chronology based on new
geological discoveries. This new information was expressed in terms of time's cycle as an endless four-stage repetition
for the earth of erosion, deposition, consolidation, and uplift, a process that demonstrated for the principal geological
discoverer, "no vestige of a beginning--no prospect of an end."[11]
With these discoveries came the concept of "deep time," which struck at the comforting directional arrow of history
focused on human domination of a newly formed earth ruled by human will within days of its origin. It was a concept
of almost incomprehensible immensity, with humanity restricted to the last few inches on the geological mile or to an
appearance on the cosmic calendar just before the singing of Auld Lang Syne. In any event, as Mark Twain pointed
out, there was not much comfort to be gained no matter what the metaphor might be.
Man has been here 32,000 years. That it took a hundred million years to prepare the world for him is proof
that that is what it was done for. I suppose it is, I dunno. If the Eiffel Tower were now representing the
world's age, the skin of paint on the pinnacle-knob at its summit would represent man's share of that age;
and anybody would perceive that that skin was what the tower was built for. I reckon they would, I
dunno.[12]

The cyclic variations of the earth in deep time were more than counterbalanced by Charles Darwin's mid-19th-century
theory of evolution, which added new characteristics to the linearity of time's arrow. For Darwin emphasized the
contingent aspect of natural history, in which events often depend crucially upon happenings from a distant past that
appeared small and trivial at the time, but gradually create a new pathway with cascading sequences of unpredictable
events. In this historical explanation, the phenomenon to be explained (E) occurred because D preceded it, preceded in
turn by C, B, and A. If any of these antecedents did not occur or occurred in different ways, then E would not exist or
would exist in greatly altered form. Consequently, E could be explained in detail as the result of A through D--a result
dependent, or contingent, upon everything that came before. But no immanent law or principle emerged in a cyclic
sense. The divine tape player could hold countless scenarios; and any variant of E that came about from different
antecedents in a replaying of the tape would be equally plausible, though greatly different in form and effect.[13]
It was this recurring possibility in time's arrow of a kingdom lost for want of a horseshoe nail that inevitably led to the
unsettling focus in Darwinian theory on chance in terms of physical linkage over time, whether it was ancestral ape to
modern humans or sediments of an ancient ocean basin to rocks of a later continent. At the same time, the variant of
contingency in time's arrow also weakened the metaphor's sense of directional progress, a serious matter for Darwin, a
citizen of Victorian Britain at the height of its empire and industrial triumph. Part of the answer was to be found in the
cyclic immanence of a general law of nature such as natural selection, operating in the background of history's
contingent detail and yielding the order he perceived as prevalent in the world. But the linkage of biological adaptation
of species to specific local environments and the directional progress of time's arrow was always tenuous. Natural
selection, for example, was never for Darwin, contrary to the popular view of Darwinism, an all-encompassing process
that produced optimal results. On the contrary, Darwin recognized that the primary proofs of evolution lay in the
chance imperfections that demonstrate how organisms alter through time by sub-optimal adaptive responses to changes
in local environments--"descent with modification"--all without reference to progress.[14]
Time's Arrow and the Individual
The random, multiple opportunistic element in Darwin's theory was repugnant to Karl Marx, whose link to the arrow of
the 18th century Deists had earned him the sobriquet of "Christian heretic." For Marx, there was still the primacy of
central design, now rechristened the Dialectic. Most importantly for the German philosopher, man was a unique
species who could perturb or alter the process of history. In The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, he captured
this aspect of history as a dynamic balance between the inexorability of forces and the power of individuals. "Men
make their own history," he wrote, "but they do not make it just as they please."[15]
Marx's focus on the power of individuals illustrates the fascination with the "what ifs" in time's arrow that continues to
the present in popular culture. Thus there is Arnold Schwarzenegger as The Terminator, returned from an apocalyptic
future to kill the mother of Dennis Conner to ensure that the future revolutionary leader is never born. Conversely,
there is Michael J. Fox as Marty McFly in Back to the Future, who by returning in time threatens to alter the initial run
of the contingent tape when his mother, in a variation on Oedipus, begins to be attracted to him. As a consequence,
McFly must rectify apparently unimportant events that he knows, if not corrected, could mean that his parents never
meet and thus end his own existence. Finally, in Frank Capra's It's a Wonderful Life, there is Jimmy Stewart as George
Bailey, a decent hardworking owner of a Savings and Loan in the small town of Bedford Falls, who decides on suicide
when he sees his company in bankruptcy even as he is charged with fraud. "If it hadn't been for me," he tells his
guardian angel, Clarence Odbody (Henry Travers), "everybody would be a lot better off."[16] Clarence then shows
George an alternate vision of the town, replayed in his absence and yielding entirely different but logical outcomes in
terms of the personalities and economic forces. Without the apparently insignificant life of George Bailey, who
imparted kindness and success to his town, the alternate world of Bedford Falls, and indeed far beyond that world, is
bleak and cruel. "Strange, isn't it?" Clarence concludes at the end. "Each man's life touches so many other lives, and
when he isn't around he leaves an awful hole, doesn't he?"[17]
Clarence's observation applies even more widely to the field of national security, in which the role of individual
leaders in time's arrow is a constant reminder that strategy is far from being a science and that international politics,
like evolution, can go down very different paths based on particular events. The Korean War, for example, illustrates
this type of contingency. For absent Kim Il Sung's decision to attack southward, the Cold War might have taken an
entirely different form--one without high defense budgets, increased Sino-American hostility, a militarized NATO,

and US global commitments. In fact, that long twilight war, as John Lewis Gaddis has illustrated, is a monument to the
role of individuals in contingent history on both sides of the bipolar world.
What if Lenin had never made it to the Finland Station? What if Stalin had followed his mother's wishes
and become a priest instead of a bank robber? What if, say Molotov and not Khrushchev had been
running the Soviet Union at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis? What if the rail line from Moscow to
the Caucasus had not been built through Stavropol, so that Brezhnev, Andropov, and other Kremlin
bigwigs traveling to their vacations in the south might never have met the bright young party boss of that
region, who wound up presiding over the end of what Lenin began? . . . What if Henry Wallace and not
Harry Truman had been President at the time the cold war began? Or if Robert Taft instead of Dwight
Eisenhower had occupied the White House at the time it escalated? Or if Richard Nixon, with his wellknown habits of cool-headedness in the face of crisis, had had to handle Soviet missiles in Cuba instead of
John Kennedy? Or if Kennedy and not Johnson had run the Vietnam War? What peculiar twist of fate left
it to Nixon, of all people, to end the cold war with the People's Republic of China during the 1970s, and to
Ronald Reagan, of all people, to do the same a decade later with the Soviet Union? And, for that matter, I
wonder sometimes, late at night, what Franklin D. Roosevelt would have thought the country had come to
if he could have returned, four decades after his death, to find his old office occupied by someone he knew
quite well, but only as a movie actor?[18]
When viewed from this perspective, the explanation of historical events in the Cold War does not lie so much in
immanent principles as in the realm of contingent detail, much the way the law of gravity may explain how an apple
falls but not why a particular apple fell at a particular moment from a particular tree, and why at that moment Newton
happened to be sitting under that tree ready to be inspired. And yet, as Marx recognized, there is also the human
uniqueness from other species that acts as a counterforce to human unity with nature in time's arrow, and that allows
man at the very least to learn from time's cyclic repetition even if no overarching principles can be established. Man's
cultural evolution, for instance, is vastly faster than biological change, since it is direct and Lamarkian in form with the
achievements of one generation being passed by education and publication directly to descendants. Equally important,
biological evolution is a system of divergence which ensures that once lineages are distinct, they are separate forever.
But transmission across lineages is a major source of cultural change in human history that has only accelerated with
the advent of the information-communication-transportation revolutions.[19] From this uniqueness comes the human
capacity to exercise some control over contingent history and thus to impart a sense of tragedy when that control does
not occur. "The terrible `Ifs' accumulate," Winston Churchill noted in this regard, as he looked back on the failure of
European leaders to control events in the hot summer days of 1914.[20]
There has been very little need for such retrospect concerning the Cold War, which over and above the contingent
vagaries of chance also illustrates for the student of national security the capacity of individual leaders to learn,
mature, and grow, no matter how improbable or unexpected the events within time's arrow that catapulted them into
key positions. President Truman, the only leader ever to authorize the military use of nuclear weapons, used his diary
to vent his urge to use such weapons against the Soviet Union. But it was Truman who set the important precedent in
Korea that nuclear powers do not automatically employ such weapons when they become involved in wars. And it was
John Foster Dulles, renowned as the prototypical Cold War ideologue, who looked toward the eventual goal of
abolishing nuclear weapons even as he moved toward George Kennan's vision of eventually transforming the Soviet
Union into a normal member of the world community. In a similar manner, there was Dulles's boss, who spent most of
his adult life as a professional soldier, and yet so eloquently as a politician tied together the domestic and foreign
implications concerning growth of the national security state in the long twilight war:
Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft
from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed. . . . The cost of one
modern heavy bomber is this: a modern brick school in more than 30 cities. It is two electric power plants,
each serving a town of 60,000 population. It is two fine, fully equipped hospitals. It is some 50 miles of
concrete highway. We pay for a single fighter plane with a half million bushels of wheat. We pay for a
single destroyer with new homes that could have housed more than 8,000 people.[21]
Time's Arrow, the State, and the International System

Evolution also suggests that within time's arrow the fact that human beings and the states they create learn from
experience brings about new ways of doing things, whether at the level of the entire international system, or the
grouping of states within that system. From a biological view, structures in the form of living organisms evolve as they
adapt to local environments. In a similar manner, states and international systems may change when confronted with
the implications of long-term alterations in the political, economic, intellectual, technological, and cultural
environment. These changes may be gradual--like the effects of natural selection--with no discernible consequences
for long periods of time. In fact, for Karl Marx the basic assumption in this regard was that only when these
consequences occurred were underlying historical processes revealed. From this perspective, the cumulative effects
during the Cold War of linear processes such as interdependence, the spread of democracy, the emergence of
international regimes, and, ironically, fundamental problems in Marxism-Leninism only became apparent over time at
the levels of state and international systems. By then the long twilight struggle was over, the result of directional
movement within time's arrow that was irreversible.[22]
From another evolutionary perspective, change may occur faster as a primary reaction to a single historical event.
White moths in Great Britain, for instance, turned black in response to the advent of the industrial revolution and the
concomitant darkening of trees. In a similar manner, the shift from religious to secular authority that occurred in
Europe during the 15th and 16th centuries was a major change in the environment that led to the growth of the modern
state system. On a more recent note, slavery had been present throughout history and yet was abolished almost
universally within a single lifetime in the 19th century because of the erosion of the climate of legitimacy that
sustained that institution. That such a response to environment can work in both shorter and less enlightening ways was
demonstrated in the chilling description of adverse incrementalism by the Protestant theologian Martin Niemoller:
First the Nazis went after the Jews, but I wasn't a Jew, so I did not react. Then they went after the
Catholics, but I wasn't a Catholic, so I didn't object. Then they went after the workers, so I didn't stand up.
Then they went after the Protestant clergy and by then it was too late for anybody to stand up.[23]
Finally, evolutionary biology also demonstrates that sudden environmental shifts can exterminate old species and
create favorable conditions for the emergence of new ones, which then can result in a stable status quo for relatively
long periods. The sudden demise of the dinosaur 60 million years ago in the Paleozoic era is one example. The almost
psychological effect of nuclear weapons is another. Earlier military technological breakthroughs had never immediately
revealed the complete results of their use. The invention of the machine gun, for instance, inspired no concomitant
vision of the horrific slaughter of the Somme; nor did that of poison gas reflect an appreciation of the effect that would
be produced by the first dusty, lethal cloud at Ypres. The full consequences of using the atomic bomb, however,
became apparent at Hiroshima just when the world became aware of the new weapon's existence. As a consequence,
the initial nuclear shock was a prime cause for a stable world order that lasted over four decades. Two states
preeminent in nuclear capability, as Kenneth Waltz points out, "isolationist by tradition, untutored in the ways of
international politics, and famed for impulsive behavior, soon showed themselves--not always and everywhere, but
always in crucial cases--to be wary, alert, cautious, flexible, and forbearing."[24]
War and the Need for the Balance of Time's Cycle
The Cold War belongs in many ways to time's cycle. Despite its unique Orwellian mix of peace and war, it was still a
struggle with massive stakes that included a geopolitical rivalry for control of the Eurasian landmass and ultimately the
world, and an ideological one in which philosophy in the deepest sense of mankind's self-definition was very much at
issue. The end of the Cold War, then, represents a victory at least as decisive and one-sided as the defeat of
Napoleonic France in 1815, or of Imperial Germany in 1918, or of the Axis in 1945. In terms of the actual
capitulation, that moment may have come at the 19 November 1990 Paris summit when Gorbachev accepted the
conditions of the victorious coalition by describing the unification of Germany that had come about completely on
Western terms as a "major event"--a description that Zbigniew Brzezinski has termed the functional equivalent to the
acts of surrender in the railroad car at Compiègne in November 1918 and on the USS Missouri in August 1945.[25]
These cyclic aspects notwithstanding, no one expected to see the sudden end of the Soviet Empire in Europe, the
dissolution of the Soviet state, and the repudiation of communism itself throughout that disintegrating state. "In
understanding the collapse of communism and the Soviet state," Ronald Steel points out in this regard, "the strategists

in government, at universities, and in the well-financed limbo in between have been virtually irrelevant."[26] One
answer to this failure was found in a renewed focus on time's arrow--an increasing emphasis after the Cold War on
what are perceived as unique, irreversible forces and trends that began the great changes in the penultimate decade of
this century and continue to swirl with great effect during the current transition period. Nowhere is this tendency more
prevalent than in those national security issues dealing with the nature of war at all three levels of analysis.
Time's Cycle and the Individual
At the individual level of analysis, time's arrow appears to predominate in the current transition period. For many, there
is a unique sense of human progress concerning warfare, stimulated in part by the escape from the Cold War without a
major hot war. The relief has been particularly sharp because the Damoclean sword of great power nuclear warfare
never fell. There is a natural tendency to see this as a reaction to horrific images of future wars under the new, unique
technology and as a consequence of what Joseph Nye has called "nuclear learning." This type of reaction eventually
penetrated all three levels of analysis, permitting the establishment of stable security regimes that encouraged both
superpowers to put long-term mutual considerations above shorter-term self-interests. The result was the acceptance of
formal and informal norms as a basis for behavior and rules of engagement that came to include the development of
Permissive Action Links (PAL), second-strike nuclear capabilities, intrusive verification systems, and tacitly tolerated
satellite reconnaissance.[27]
All this reinforces a general perception during the current transition concerning what John Mueller has described as
the "obsolescence" of great power war. Mueller argues, however, that the near-term effects of the nuclear technology
have been confused with a long-term trend toward ending great power conflict, caused in part by the public reaction to
two world wars. Nevertheless, it would appear that at the very least, as Carl Kaysen has pointed out, "These new
technologies of war have amplified the message of this century's war experiences by many decibels, and set it firmly in
the minds of the wide public as well as those of political and military leaders."[28] How firmly that message has been
received was illustrated in 1987 by the entertainer Michael Feinstein while performing a series of songs by Irving
Berlin in the Oak Room of the Algonquin Hotel in New York City. As he rendered the 1911 hit song, "Alexander's
Ragtime Band," Feinstein stopped on the line that points out the way the band plays a bugle call is "so natural that you
want to go to war," struck by the anachronistic sentiment. "It's an old song," he explained.[29]
Unfortunately, time's cycle is a reminder that it is unlikely, as Prince Andrei in Tolstoy's War and Peace believed, that
war can become so horrible that man and therefore nations will renounce it. History, in this case, is not just linear in
character with precise beginnings and ends triumphantly proclaimed. It is also, in part, as Edward Gibbon pointed out
in his study of the decline and fall of Rome, "little more than the register of the crimes, follies, and misfortunes of
mankind."[30] From this cyclic vantage point, the horrific effects on man of new war technologies are hardly a
reassuring basis for predicting obsolescence of that institution even at the great power level. The technologies of World
War I, for example, washed away previous misconceptions concerning modern war in a sea of blood, leaving an
indelible mark across an entire generation. The reaction of that generation was captured by Dick Diver, F. Scott
Fitzgerald's protagonist in Tender is the Night, when he revisits the Somme battlefield after the war. "This westernfront business couldn't be done again," he explains less than two decades before World War II.
The young men think they could do it but they couldn't. . . . This took religion and years of plenty and
tremendous sureties and the exact relation that existed between the classes. . . . You had to have a wholesouled sentimental equipment going back further than you could remember. You had to remember
Christmas, and postcards of the Crown Prince and his fiancee, and little cafes in Valence and beer gardens
in Unter den Linden and weddings at the mairie, and going to the Derby, and your grandfather's whiskers.
. . . This kind of battle was invented by Lewis Carroll and Jules Verne and whoever wrote Undine, and
country deacons bowling and marraines in Marseilles and girls seduced in the back lanes of Wurtemburg
and Westphalia. Why, this was a love battle--there was a century of middle-class love spent here. This
was the last love battle.[31]
In a similar manner, time's cycle offers very little comfort in terms of restraint concerning nuclear weapons. That such
restraint could break down in an age of proliferation is reinforced by time streams going as far back as 1137, when the
Lateran Council banned the use of the crossbow against Christian enemies, citing that weapon as not only destructive

to mankind, but as being hateful to God. Richard Coeur de Lion reintroduced the crossbow into European wars, and
many saw his death in 1199 by a bolt from that weapon as a clear expression of divine displeasure at the affront to
chivalric custom which disapproved of all weapons other than sword and lance. Nevertheless, technological innovation
continued to outstrip the Council's prohibitions in the years to come. By 1529, Pierre du Tuerrail de Bayard, chevalier
sans peur et sans reproche, could thank God that he had always used the proper weapons against knights: the sword,
the lance, and the crossbow.[32]
This discouraging cyclic immanence also extends to other weapons of mass destruction (WMD). A Japanese cult broke
the taboo against use of such weapons when it used a lethal chemical nerve agent on the Tokyo subway in March 1995,
killing 12 and injuring thousands. And closer to home, right-wing extremists have been involved in various plots
against federal agencies and officials involving radiological materials as well as ricin, an extremely toxic biological
agent, and vials of freeze-dried bubonic plague. As constraints against use of WMD continue to erode, crude designs
of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons are increasingly available in print and on the Internet even while
components for such weapons continue to leak from inadequately secured facilities in the former Soviet Union. As if
this dismal proof of cyclic continuity were not enough, the persistence of time's arrow in an evolutionary sense also
works in adverse symbiosis. For terrorists, as the Oklahoma City bombing demonstrates, have like biological
organisms made sub-optimal adaptive responses to their environment. The use of a fertilizer designed to enhance
creation and growth as an effective, conventional sub-optimal substitute for WMDs is a tragically ironic confirmation
of Darwin's perception of time's arrow as descent with modification.[33]
In all this, as the 20th century and the millennium come to a close, there is very little evidence and therefore little
comfort from the concept of progress in time's arrow. Once again, as Barbara Tuchman illustrated in her study of the
"calamitous 14th century" as a "distant mirror" of the current century, time's cycle dominates at the first level of
analysis. "History never repeats itself," Voltaire said in this regard, "man always does."[34] Thus for Tuchman, there is
the reflection across the ages from the century of Hiroshima and the Holocaust to a distraught age in which rules were
breaking down under the pressure of adverse and violent events, not the least of which was the Black Death, the most
lethal disaster in recorded history. It is this empathy that ultimately, as the famed historian pointed out, provides the
only degree of comfort for the individual, a comparison that is compelling in a period of similar disarray: "If our last
decade or two of collapsing assumptions has been a period of unusual discomfort, it is reassuring to know that the
human species has lived through worse before."[35] It is a cyclic reassurance that at the first level of analysis lacks the
grandeur and promise of progress in time's arrow, but as historians throughout the ages have discovered, provides the
only realistic source of comfort. Thus Thucydides could write that given human nature, past events "will at some time
or other and in much the same ways, be repeated in the future."[36] And over two millennia later as the lights went out
all over Europe, Arnold Toynbee was struck by the sustenance offered by the cyclic metaphor.
The general war of 1914 overtook me expounding Thucydides to Balliol undergraduates. . . . and then
suddenly my understanding was illuminated. The experience that we were having in our world now had
been experienced by Thucydides in his world already. I was rereading him now with a new perception-perceiving meanings in his words, and feelings behind his phrases, to which I had been insensible until I,
in my turn, had run into that historical crisis that had inspired him to write his work. Thucydides, it now
appeared, had been over this ground before. He and his generation had been ahead of me and mine in the
stage of historical experience that we had respectively reached; in fact, his present had been my future.
But this made nonsense of the chronological notation which registered my world as "modern" and
Thucydides' world as "ancient." Whatever chronology might say, Thucydides' world and my world had
now proved to be philosophically contemporary.[37]
Time's Cycle and the State
In the summer of 1989, the political scientist Francis Fukuyama published an article that viewed the triumph of
Western liberal democracy over Marxism-Leninism as proof that Hegel's vision of an end to history had finally
occurred. Like Marx, who committed a similar fallacy by establishing the proletarian revolution as the final stage in
history, Fukuyama predicted "centuries of boredom" because of "the total exhaustion of viable systemic alternatives to
Western liberalism."[38] It was an obituary based on the confluence of many trends that appeared unique in time's
arrow as the Cold War ended, ranging from the failure of command economies to the increased permeability of

borders due to the information and communication revolutions, revolutions that had empowered the individual rather
than, as George Orwell had predicted, the state. But it was also an obituary, as Michael Howard pointed out, that could
be premature.
The failure of rival creeds does not mean that our own is bound to succeed, only that it has been given
another chance. Both fascism and communism emerged in Europe because liberal democracy failed to live
up to its expectations. If we fail again, we may expect new and similar challenges, both in our own
continent and throughout the world.[39].
Such warnings also apply to the widespread view in contemporary social science that war between mature, stable
democracies has been exceedingly rare--a view that has received increasing prominence in the Clinton
Administration.[40] In this regard, there is an important cyclic reminder that nations don't become stable, mature
democracies overnight. Instead, as a recent study demonstrates, there is a tendency in the early stages of
democratization for countries to become more aggressive and war-prone as elites faced with democratization attempt
to maintain their positions by using populist, nationalist themes to mobilize mass public support. The problem, as
history abundantly illustrates, is that like the sorcerer's apprentice, elites find it easier to create mass allies than to
control them. When this happens, hard-pressed leaders attempt to retain control of centrifugal political coalitions by
using nationalistic prestige strategies that can lead to war. Thus, there was mid-Victorian Britain, positioned between
the partial democracy of the 1832 Reform Bill and the full-fledged mass politics of the Gladstone era, swept into the
Crimean War by the impetus of jingoistic public opinion. On a much larger scale, there was the ruling elite of
Wilhelmine Germany dealing with the adverse mixture of universal suffrage and limited governmental accountability
by competing with middle-class mass groups for the mantle of German nationalism in an ever-escalating process that
led to World War I.[41] And on a more recent note in the current transition period, there is the case of a nuclear-armed
great power like Russia making the leap from total autocracy to extensive mass democracy against the background of
tense relations with its neighbors in the "near abroad," while popular support grows for radical nationalists.[42]
There are other cyclic cautionaries at the state level of analysis--all within the lingering uniqueness of time's arrow in
the current transition period. Most striking is the residual uniqueness of an American governmental structure formed by
the Cold War with national security concerns dominant and a military establishment transcendent. The result is a vast
national security apparatus that stretches from the White House and the State Department across the Potomac to the
Pentagon where over 25,000 workers man the tip of the defense iceberg, to the Central Intelligence Agency farther out
in Virginia. No one expects Washington to return to the Cincinnatian capital of the 1930s when the State, War, and
Navy Departments were all housed in what is now the Old Executive Office Building. At the same time, however,
there is the clear necessity to adjust institutions for the new era. In the previous transition period, the task was easier
since the United States had so little international affairs machinery and experience, and thus could build from a fresh
base that allowed its newly emerging policy elites to be "present at the creation." There is, to say the least, no
comparable void in Washington during the current transition. The task, however, remains the same as in the last
transition to ensure that governmental form and function proceed apace in response to historical change. Ernest May
has described what happens in time's cycle when these two characteristics grow apart in capitals of nation states as a
result of such change.
In Westminster, the houses of Parliament and Buckingham Palace--both structures of the Victorian era-and the Georgian and Regency offices along Whitehall are buildings for a seat of empire, not for the
capital of a middle-ranking member of the European Community. The drab, modest government office
blocks of Tokyo and Bonn seem equally ill-suited, given that they serve the second and third ranking
powers of the economic world. None of these capitals vies with Vienna, where the magnificent Hofburg is
the seat of government for a republic smaller than Indiana.[43]
The most remarkable aspect of the growth of the national security state in the Cold War was the emergence of a huge
standing military force that ultimately provided the United States a balanced global reach unlike that of any great
power in history. The current joint air, land, and sea effectiveness of American forces, for instance, stands in sharp
contrast to the situation at the zenith of the Royal Navy's rule of the sea under the Pax Britannica when Bismarck
noted that if the British army should land on the coast of Prussia, he would have the local police arrest it. The vastness
of the force required for preserving the "long peace" while prosecuting the "long war" on a global scale was captured

by Zbigniew Brzezinski at the height of the Cold War when he noted that there were:
more than a million American troops stationed on some 400 major and almost 300 minor United States
military bases scattered all over the globe. [That there were] more than forty-two nations tied to the United
States by security pacts, American military missions training the officers and troops of many other national
armies, and . . . approximately two hundred thousand United States civilian government employees in
foreign posts all makes for striking analogies to the great classical imperial systems.[44]
This situation has clearly changed with the end of the Cold War. Downsizing is a fact of life for the US military in this
transition period as it was in a cyclic perspective after the other two great conflicts of this century. The principal
reason, like that at the conclusion of most wars, is that the overarching threat has virtually disappeared. Equally
important, there is the public perception that there has been an erosion of the 500-year-old linkage between military
and economic strength as a symbiotic means of producing predominance in world politics.[45] By the 1980s, there was
already a general feeling that there was a price to pay for emphasizing military security over solvency, that the 40-year
quest for military advantages in the Cold War had done nothing to protect the United States from economic decline
and social disequilibrium, and in fact in many cases had exacerbated those problems. That perception was reinforced
by the massive economically induced implosion of the Soviet Union that ended the Cold War. Added to that was the
recognition that the "long war" for both superpowers had truly been a "long peace" for Germany and Japan, precisely
because, like the tiny Duchy of Fenwick in the film The Mouse that Roared, their defeat in war had allowed them to
separate economic growth from military capability.[46]
In the wake of the Cold War, US administrations have attempted to deal with these perceptions, acutely aware in
time's cycle of the problems ranging from military readiness to civil-military relations that have resulted in the past
from the familiar American pattern of postwar demobilization. In the Bush Administration, the military's base force
concept still reflected in the absence of a specific threat the Cold War desire to strike a balance between
multilateralism and unilateralism. That in turn guaranteed that force requirements would exceed peace dividend
expectations--a trend in the face of uncertain regional threats increasingly hard to justify with generic color plans. "I'm
running out of villains," General Powell remarked in this regard; "I'm down to Fidel Castro and Kim Il Sung."[47] The
Clinton Administration initially turned for a solution to "assertive multilateralism," but soon retreated to the more
restrictive policy of Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25, faced like Woodrow Wilson in time's cycle with public
postwar disillusionment concerning extravagant internationalism.[48]
Time's Cycle and the International System
In the post-Cold War era, there has also been a renewed emphasis on time's arrow in the international system against
the backdrop of unique trends such as those concerning global transparency and global environment. These trends are
the cumulative results of the forces unleashed by the revolutions in communications, information, transportation, and
technology that predated the end of the Cold War. Theorists as early as the 1970s argued that with the expansion of
commerce as a result of these forces and trends, relationships based on cooperation and integration were becoming at
least as important as traditional geopolitical competition. In the intervening years, liberal analysts have concluded that
the unique, linear evolution of complex economic interdependence fosters peace by causing trading to be more
profitable than war. Interdependent states, in other words, would rather trade than invade--a conclusion at the systems
level of analysis for these theorists reinforced by the cumulative learning at the individual and state levels focused on
changing values and what is perceived as the irreversible victory of liberal capitalism. From this perspective, war is a
particularly counterproductive way for any rational nation-state to achieve the central goals of prosperity and economic
growth.[49]
It is, however, a perspective that overreacts to forces and trends in time's arrow while ignoring the immediate and
long-term implications of time's cycle. In the short-term, it is not economic interdependence that has brought about
great power peace. Instead, it was the bipolar peace of the Cold War, founded on rivalry and fear of nuclear war, not
desire for profit, that induced the cooperation that made economic interdependence safe and therefore possible. In a
world in which there is little likelihood of large-scale conflict, states are less concerned about the dependencies that
such interdependence creates and about the relative economic disadvantages that open markets produce.[50] At the
same time, as leaders in the current transition period react to a variety of "unique" ethnic and religious strife

throughout the globe, the Cold War is a useful reminder that during the superpower stability of that long twilight
conflict, no such condition occurred for very long in the so-called Third World, a categorization of nation-states that
even owed its origins to the bipolar nature of the international system. In that world, the absence of superpower war
was not synonymous with global peace; nor was the absence of system transformation through war translated into
global stability. Instead, recurrent violence in an unstable "peripheral" system occurred alongside a stable "central"
system, with an estimated 127 wars and over 21 million war-related deaths taking place in the developing world during
the Cold War.[51]
On a larger cyclic note, realist theorists contend that economic interdependence has not only failed to lead to peace in
the past, but in fact has increased the likelihood of war. By the close of the 19th century, for example, more of the
world was more closely interlocked, economically and financially, than at any previous time. By 1910, Norman Angell
could assert in his best-selling The Great Illusion that war was irrational on economic grounds since the destructiveness
of modern conflict was incompatible with commerce and would thus bring modern, interdependent industrial nations to
ruin.[52] Three years later, Britain was the leading market for German exports, and Britain followed the United States
very closely as Germany's primary bilateral trade partner. World War I the next year appeared to demonstrate that
states dependent on others for vital resources in an anarchic global system would have increased incentives to go to
war in order, as Kenneth Waltz points out, "to control what they depend on or to lessen the extent of their
dependency."[53] Positive trade expectations may mitigate somewhat the automatic realist equation of continued high
interdependence with conflict. But at the very least, the Great War sounds a note of cyclic caution to liberals confident
in the slipstream of post-Cold War forces and trends that a new day in time's arrow is dawning for the international
system.[54]
That caution is amplified by other theorists who perceive global war occurring in time's cycle approximately every 100
to 150 years.[55] From these wars emerge single hegemons that are not necessarily the most powerful states, but the
ones best positioned to dominate the international system and create a period of stability. Stability is then followed by
uneven rates of economic and technological growth among states that encourage efforts to change the system-"disequilibrium" in Robert Gilpin's description, "between the existing governance of the international system and the
underlying distribution of power in the system."[56] New would-be hegemons rise accompanied by the current
hegemon's decline--the result of such factors as exhaustion, bureaucratization, and loss of creativity that stem from the
hegemonic efforts and the stability those efforts have created. From this perspective in the modern era, one
interpretation is that change of leadership occurred when Germany challenged Britain's dominance of the international
system in the late 19th and early 20th century. That challenge led to both world wars, perceived as two segments of a
single global upheaval from which the United States emerged as the new dominant power. The upshot of this and
similar cyclic views was that the international stability of the global system in the Cold War was not an aberrant
historical event, but the peaceful phase that normally follows a period of global war and major readjustment involving,
as John Lewis Gaddis has pointed out, "a brief, unsuccessful, and not even particularly interesting challenge by the
Soviet Union to the hegemonic position the United States established for itself in world politics after 1945."[57]
A concomitant to such interpretations was the subsequent "disequilibrium" in the global system--reflected in the
growing "declinist" view, represented in the national debates generated by the 1987 publication of Paul Kennedy's The
Rise and Fall of the Great Powers as the Cold War was ending. From the standpoint of the public, with its general
sense of American exceptionalism, nothing appeared quite so disturbing as the declinist assertions that the United
States might soon share the "fall" common to every hegemon of the past. Nor was the blow softened by a growing
realization, reflected in the debates, that the successful development of American political institutions and economic
systems in the major axis powers of World War II might well play a prominent role in that decline. The result was
ironic, with the idea of a more modest future being generally rejected by the public at the same time that a disposition
not to pay for America's position in the world was increasing in the Reagan years.[58]
The declinist debates are a useful reminder that like a flea crawling in minute linearity on a hula hoop, national security
analysts in the post-Cold War era may over-focus on the unique aspects of time's arrow in this transition period to the
detriment of larger cycles concerning peer threats and hegemonic wars. In any event, cyclical theorists do not deny the
arrow of linear evolution that prevents a precise repetition of cycles, acknowledging instead that even as cycles operate
they move forward in time, always subjected to modification by non-cyclical forces. For example, the frequency and
amplitude of cycles concerning recurring hegemonic wars may be diminished by the linear development in time's

arrow of nuclear weapons; by social consciousness toward war similar to that which almost completely eliminated
slavery and dueling; and by growing political awareness that accelerates trends toward democratic forms of
government.[59] On the other hand, if the cycles of global wars stem from uneven rates of economic and technological
growth, and if there is an acceleration of that growth, hegemons may remain hegemons for increasingly shorter
periods; a new hegemonic war may be just around the corner in a combination of time's cycle and time's arrow.
For other theorists, this combination renders moot any such perspective on war in the international arena, because the
role of the state, the basic player at the second level of analysis, is declining. The result of current forces and trends in
time's arrow, Martin van Creveld posits, will be a return to an era when "religious attitudes, beliefs, and fanatacisms
will play a larger role in the motivation of armed conflict than [they have] . . . for the last 300 years."[60] It is a picture
of larger cyclic continuity, in which the state loses its monopoly over armed violence even as advanced military
technology becomes increasingly irrelevant for the low-intensity conflicts that will come to dominate war in the
international arena. "Considering the present and trying to look into the future," van Creveld concludes, "I suggest the
Clausewitzian Universe is rapidly becoming out of date and can no longer provide us with a proper framework for
understanding war."[61] To which John Keegan agrees, pointing out that technology in the form of nuclear weapons
long ago undermined Clausewitz's most basic dictum. Forces and trends in current international relations only further
discredit this proposition. "War is not the continuation of policy by other means," he concludes.
Clausewitz's thought is incomplete. It implies the existence of states, of state interests and of rational
calculation about how they may be achieved. . . . What it made no allowances for at all was war without
beginning or end, the endemic warfare of non-state, even pre-state peoples.[62]
This is assuredly much too extreme a reaction to the unique directional flow of time's arrow in the current transition
period. Overly focusing on linear forces and trends in the manner of the flea on the hula hoop can lead to strategic fads
and fashionable theories that tend to overwhelm the cumulative, cyclic understanding of history, making it difficult for
strategists to distinguish the ephemeral from the persisting and structural. The focus on global chaos and anarchy in the
developing world is an example. To elevate this to the highest level of primary national security concerns ignores
larger, more fundamental threats, while assuming much too prematurely the declining importance of great powers and
nation-states. It is true, of course, that forces and trends in time's arrow are compromising the Westphalian state model.
But given the anarchic nature of the international system, it is historically myopic to take that model as a benchmark
from some golden age when all states were identical actors exercising exclusive authority within their boundaries. In
reality, weaker states have frequently succumbed to coercion and imposition, and stronger ones have entered into
conventions and contracts that compromised their autonomy and even territoriality. Nevertheless, the model in time's
cycle has survived and continues to flourish. "In fact," one analyst points out concerning the current transition period,
while many ethnic, environmental and other humanitarian problems do cross borders, it is nation states,
with their armies, governments, laws and legitimacy that are--and will remain--the dominant force in
world affairs. And from the Balkans to the Mideast to Asia, the greatest threat to peace remains the
ambitions of nation states and leaders who are hostile to democracy and norms of international
behavior.[63]
It is incumbent on national security analysts, therefore, to remain concerned with the danger of unbalanced power as
the central organizing structure in an anarchical, self-help, state-centric world. Such a focus requires, in turn, a
constant consideration of possibilities concerning peer threats and hegemonic wars. This is not to succumb to either
cynicism or pessimism in a time of transition remarkably absent of a major clear and present danger. It is simply to
acknowledge that history is a permanent process of cooperation and competition and that this century in time's cycle
has produced three major balance-of-power wars: two hot, one cold. Seen in this light, there is nothing in the current
period that lessens the cyclic immanence of what Colin Gray calls the golden rule in world politics: "bad times return."
The possible fact that one might peer into the future from the vantage point of today and find no threats of
major substance, is quite beside the point. One can occasionally look upward and see only blue sky. Few
would draw far-reaching conclusions from that empirically unchallengeable observation of the moment.
Certainly, one would not give away all of one's bad weather clothing.[64]

Conclusion
There are two basic rules that apply to the use of time's arrow and time's cycle. The first is that the relationship is not a
zero-sum game: one metaphor in a given circumstance does not exclude the other. By itself, the assertion of the arrow
that every moment of time is unique is unsatisfactory. Man craves the immanence of time's cycle, some underlying
general ties or principles that impart order and structure by transcending the distinction of moments. In no field is this
urge more evident than in the study of national security affairs. And yet time's arrow is also an important reminder that
national security issues can evolve in different ways contingent on particular players, circumstances, and events.
The second rule is that the first rule does not mean that the two metaphors meld together in an undefined middle, a soft
pluralism that loses the essence of each vision: the uniqueness of history and the immanence of law. There is, in fact,
no blending of the two metaphors, only a coexistence in tension and fruitful interaction that offers clarity of insight on
national security issues at every level of analysis. A concomitant of the arrow's unique linearity, for example, can be a
perception of omnipresent progress. But long cycles demonstrate to analysts and leaders alike that the relevant past
extends backward far beyond what they have previously experienced. Hubris, in other words, is extremely difficult to
maintain against the broad, cyclical sweep of time. There are always reminders like the broken statue of Shelly's
"Ozymandias," once king of kings, upon whose works the mighty were to look and despair.
In the end, the student of national security affairs is left with the two separate but connected images of a large disk or
wheel rolling forward on a track. Each movement of the wheel is similar as a reflection of timeless principles and
different because the wheel has moved forward in time's arrow. The linearity of the track ensures that the analyst
remains alive to change, whether it is multi-centric forces and trends chipping away at the state-centric international
system or new threats ranging from environmental shifts to the horizontal spread of weapons of mass destruction. At
the same time, the cycle within the arrow is a reminder of the continuity that creates the viscosity of history. The
onslaught of new forces and trends notwithstanding, the basic fact in international affairs is that it is still an anarchical,
self-help, state-dominated world, in which the principles associated with balance of power as a primary management
tool retain their cyclic immanence. "What seems to work best, even though imperfectly," Donald Kagan points out, "is
the possession by those states who wish to preserve the peace of the preponderant power and of the will to accept the
burdens and responsibilities required to achieve that purpose."[65] For the United States, many of these burdens in
time's arrow will undoubtedly be unique. But the responsibilities have a cyclic basis as the country faces a situation in
the post-Cold War transition period similar to that which, in Edward Luttwak's description, confronted the Roman
Empire in its later stages:
The Romans did not face a single enemy, or even a fixed group of enemies, whose ultimate defeat would
ensure permanent security. Regardless of the amplitude of Roman victories, the frontiers of the empire
would always remain under attack, since they were barriers in the path of secular migration flows from
north to south and from east to west. Hence Roman strategy could not usefully aim at total victory at any
cost, for the threat was not temporary but endless. The only rational goal was the maintenance of a
minimally adequate level of security at the lowest feasible cost.[66]
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